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228 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
A comparison of the Illinois Statute 24 with the North Dakota Statute 2_
would seem to indicate that the decision in the instant case would have
been the same in North Dakota-all other things being equal-if it were not
for the peculiar doctrine of estoppel advocated by the Illinois Court. If the
attempted destruction of one-third of the contingent remainder had occurred
in this state prior to the passing of the statute, the plaintiff would have had
a good fee-simple title to one-third of the land.
ALBERT 'M. CHRISTOPHER
TORTS - RIGHT OF PRIVACY - RECOVERY FOR WOUNDED FEELINGS AND
MARITAL DIFFICULTIES. - Plaintiff and his wife bought an inexpensive radio
from defendant on the installment plan. When only a small balance re-
mained unpaid, defendant sent to plaintiff a post card stating: "Dear Mil-
ford, I'll be in LaGrange next week. Call me at 9693. Love, Mary." Plain-
tiff's wife read the card and, being convinced of plaintiff's infidelity, left
him. Plaintiff eventually effected a reconciliation with his wife, but the
original relationship of trust and affection between them was never restored.
Plaintiff sued for $25,000 damages for wounded feelings and marital diffi-
culties. In allowing him to recover $5,000, the court held that the defend-
ant had committed an actionable tort; that defendant was at least guilty
of a great degree of negligence. The court found it unnecessary to label
the action either as one for libel or invasion of plaintiff's right of privacy.
Nevertheless, the opinion discussed the nature of libel and also stated that
defendant had injured plaintiff in what plaintiff alleged in his petition as
..the legal right to personal security in his home, including the right of en-
joyment of life, and the enjoyment of the happiness of home and the love
and confidence of his wife." Freeman v. Busch Jewelry Co., 98 F. Supp. 963
(N.D. Ga. 1951).
The general rule has recently changed to allow recovery for injury with-
out physical hurt.1 Among other things, one may recover for mental injury.
The old theory underlying recovery for mental injury was that the plaintiff
had to show his mental suffering to be an incident of an established cause
of action 2 or had to have a physical impact accompanying it-3 Now, how-
ever, it is an independent cause of action and there need not be an impact.
4
Merrigan's Estate, 34 S. D. 644, 150 N.W. 285 (1914) (under code, remainder after
conditional life estate is not, as at common law, defeated upon forfeiture of life estate
before life tenant's death).
24. See note 2 supra.
25. See note 19 supra.
1. Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic
Stimuli, 30 Va. L. Rev. 193, 207 (1944).
2. Young v. Gormley, 120 Iowa 327, 94 N.W. 922 (1903) (illegal arrest); Parkhurst
v. Mastellar, 57 Iowa 474, 10 N.W. 864 (1881) (malicious prosecution); Spade v. Lynn
& B.R.R., 172 Mass. 488, 52 N.E. 747 (1899).
3. Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227 (1880); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81
N.W. 355 (1899).
4. Broda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and Tranquility, 28 Geo. L.J. 55 (1940);
22 Minn. L. Rev. 1070 (1938). The turning point seems to have been Hill v. KimbU,
76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
RECENT CASES
The usual rule is that the injury must be inflicted intentionally. ' The cases
are generally referred to as mental suffering or mental injury cases.,,
The right of privacy is a further step in the trend toward giving an in-
creasing amount of protection to the interest in freedom from emotional
distress. It is described as the right to be let alone or as the right to livc
one's life without unwarranted interference by the public about matters
with which the public is not concemed.7 Under this right, malice is im-
material." There is liability only if the conduct of the defendant was such
that he should have realized that he was invading privacy and that his act
would be offensive.' There must, however, be reasonable grounds for the
mental distress, that is, the one offended must have been a person of ordi-
nary feelings and intelligence.' 0
It might be pointed out that the court in the instant case could have held
that the recovery was for invasion of the right of privacy." Of course,
before the court could do so it would have to resolve the question whether
the defendant realized that his act would be offensive and whether the wife
of the plaintiff reacted as a person with nornal sensibilities. If the court
found this to be true, it is then not inconceivable that this could have been
labelled invasion of the right of privacy, for the cases which give recovery
are widely varied." In fact, that is so much the case that it might be said
that the right is nothing more than a catch all which takes care of the outside
edges of tort liability.
However, the fact remains that the court did not label the tort,' 3 except
that it was the invasion of the right to personal security in the home inclhtd-
ing the right to love and confidence of one's wife. If this goes further than
the right of privacy, an objection would arise. It would be absurd if one
must be on guard at all times to do nothing which might be expected to
offend even the tenderest sensibilities of another. Liability cannot be extend-
5. Barnett v. Collection Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.'W. 25 (1932); LaSalle
Extension University v. Fogarty, 125 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). The general trend in the law can
be seen by comparing Restatement, Torts §46 (1934) with Restatement, Torts §46
(Supp. 1948).
6. For a general discussion of the growing tendency of the courts to allow recovery
for unreasonable interference with peace of mind, allowing damages for mental distress
of an aggravated sort, when defendant writes an insulting letter to enforce payment of a
hill, see Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 1033, 1063 (1936). Also see Broda, One's Right to Enjoy Mental Peace and
tranquillity, 28 Geo. L.J. 55 (1940) on recovery for other methods of bill collection.
7. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co.
of Virginia, 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169, 171 (1940).
8. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 218 (1890).
9. Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895); Restatement, Tort §867,
comment d (1934).
10. Pound, Interests of Personality, 28 Harv. L. Rev. 343, 363 (1915).
11. 13 Pitt. L. Rev. 453 (1952).
12. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931) (unauthorized use of
true name of reformed prostitute and murder suspect in movie depicting her former
status); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Vandergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452
(1936) (obtaining confidential business information through telephone impersonation of
plaintiff); Rhodes v. Graham, 283 Ky. 255, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (wire tapping);
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 876, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (unwarranted publicity of private
debt); Deon v. Kirby Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1926) (injury to right to
cultivate social relations); De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160. 9 N.W. 146 (1881)
(stranger present during parturition).
13. For the general proposition that a tort need not be named, see Prosser, Torts
ill (1941).
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ed to all trivial indignities. However, the instant decision should not be
looked upon as an extension of liability for causing emotional distress ny
more than if the court had held the recovery to be for the invasion of pri-
vacy. The court applied the general rules applied to the right of privacy
and resolved that, "Defendant should have reasonably anticipated that 'the
open post card would fall into the hands of plaintiff's wife, would be reaid
by her and would cause such reaction as it actually did cause in this case."
The opinion therefore took into consideration the requirements for recovery
under the right of privacy. 14 In holding that the right to personal security
in his home, including the right to enjoyment of life, and the enjoyment of
the happiness of the home and the love and confidence of his wife was vio-
lated, it went no further. The only question which could then arise is,
whether the court properly resolved the requirements in accordance with ;he
facts, not whether the theory of relief was beyond that usually given by
a court.
DANIEL R. TWICHELL
WILLS - LIFE INSURANCE - CHANCE OF BENEFICIARlY BY WILL. - By the
terms of his last will, X bequeathed all his property, including the proceeds
of life insurance policies, to W, his wife. The will alternately provided that
X bequeathed all of said property to G, his grandmother, in the event he
should die unmarried. W, the designated beneficiary in the policies, di-
vorced X, who died shortly thereafter without having made any attempt,
beyond his testamentary declaration, to effect a change of beneficiary in
compliance with the requisites prescribed in the policies. Both W and G
claimed the insurance proceeds in an action in which the insurers inter-
pleaded and paid into court the amounts due under their respective policies.
Held: the will executed by X could not effect a change of beneficiary. Stone
v. Septhens, 99 N.E.2d 766 (Ohio 1951).
The named beneficiary in an insurance policy, which reserves to the in-
sured the privilege of changing the beneficiary therein, enjoys only an ex-
pecancy during the lifetime of the insured, which does not become a vested
right until the insured's death. Similarly, the expectation of a legatee under
a will vests only upon the death of the testator since it may always be re-
voked or adeemed. When the conflicting expectations of a beneficiary ard
a legatee supposedly vest simultaneously at the death of the insured-testator,
which should prevail?
Although the interest of the beneficiary in an insurance policy during the
lifetime of the insured is commonly treated as a mere expectancy or con-
tingency,1 it seems that such interest has the character of a more secured
right. The limitations upon the reserved right of the insured to change his
beneficiary at will, as outlined in the contract of insurance, are sometimes
said to be for the benefit of the insurer alone,2 but it is certain that both
insured and beneficiary are protected and benefited as well. 3 One expres-
14. The court also stated that the implication of the post card was libelous.
1. Freund v. Freund, 218 I1. 189. 75 N.E. 925 (1905).
2. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Dotson, 98 F. Supp. 588 (S.D. W. Va. 1950).
8. See Wannamaker v. Stroman, 167 S.C. 484, 166 S.E. 621, 628 (1982); See
Pedron v. Olds, 193 Ark. 1026, 105 S.W.2d 70 (1987).
